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Abstract
This article will attempt both to describe the evolution effected by the regulations upon the
United States’ “alternative” seabed mining regime, and to explore some of the international consequences flowing therefrom.
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THE "ALTERNATIVE" SEABED MINING
REGIME: 1981*
Dennis W. Arrow * *
INTRODUCTION
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA)' acting pursuant to the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act 2 (Act), has now promulgated its second set of regulaThe regime is "alternative" in the sense that it may ultimately provide a legal seabed
mining framework for those nations, possibly including the United States, which fail to ratify
the UNCLOS-proposed Sea Treaty and its "common heritage"-oriented seabed provisions.
See, Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/L.78 (August 28, 1981),
arts. 133-91; id., Annexes III, IV; Arrow, Prospective Impacts of the Draft Sea Convention,
1 Int. Prop. Inv. J. (1981) [hereinafter cited as Prospective Impacts of the Draft Sea
Convention].
•* Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University, LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1975;
J.D., California Western School of Law, 1974; B.A., George Washington University, 1970.
The author acknowledges the valuable assistance of Ms. Amy Wellington in the preparation
of this article.
1. Specifically, the regulations were created in and will be administered by the Office of
Ocean Minerals and Energy of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [hereinafter cited as NOAA]. NOAA is an agency of the United States Department of Commerce.
While earlier versions of the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act had assigned the lead
agency role to the Department of the Interior, the final draft substituted NOAA as lead
agency due, inter alia, to its greater specialized expertise in dealing with the marine environment. Compare, e.g., Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act (proposed), S. 493, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. 18554, § 4(14) (1979), with the version finally enacted on June 28,
1980 as the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act [hereinafter cited as the "Act"], Pub.
L. 96-283, § 4(12), 94 Stat. 553 (to be codified in 30 U.S.C. § 1401), reprinted in 49
U.S.L.W. 105 (August 12, 1980), and 19 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1003 (1980).
2. Act, supra note 1, § 116. In applying its discretion, NOAA is directed, inter alia, by
the three declared domestic purposes stated in § 2(b) of the Act:
...to establish, pending the ratification by, and entering into force with respect to,
the United States of . . . a [comprehensive Law of the Sea] Treaty, an interim
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tions affecting United States citizens 3 wishing to participate in the

program to regulate the exploration for and commercial recovery of hard mineral
resourses of the deep seabed by United States citizens; . . . to accelerate the program
of environmental assessment of exploration for and commercial recovery of hard
mineral resources of the deep seabed and assure that such exploration and recovery
activities are conducted in a manner which will encourage the conservation of such
resources, protect the quality of the environment, and promote the safety of life and
property at sea; and . . . to encourage the continued development of technology
necessary to recover the hard mineral resources of the deep seabed.
3. The United States, of course, has internationally cognizable jurisdiction to regulate
the conduct of its citizens, wherever undertaken. See, e.g., Sachs v. Government of the Canal
Zone, 176 F.2d 292 (5th Cir, 1949); United States v. Aluminum Corp. of Am., 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945); 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (1968). That citizenship

and not territoriality is the basis for the jurisdictional assertion is evidenced by the stated
premises of the Act, which are that seabed minerals beyond the limits of national jurisdiction
are subject to ownership through capture, that their recovery is protected by the freedom of
the seas principle, and that no sovereign claim to the seabed itself is necessary to support a
claim to harvest the resources thereon, just as no sovereign claim to the sea itself is necessary
to sustain a claim to mid-oceanic fishing rights. See, Act, supra note 1, § 2(a)(12), § 3(a).
Moreover, § 101(a)(1) of the Act makes it clear that only United States citizens are affected by
its provisions. The Act further includes within its definition of "citizens", however, "any
corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or other entity (whether organized or
existing under the laws of any of the United States or a foreign nation) if the controlling
interest in such entity is held by an individual or entity described in subparagraph(A) or
(B). "Act, § 4(14)(c) (emphasis added); see also Department of Commerce, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, Deep Seabed Mining Regulations Affecting Pre-Enactment
Explorers, 15 C.F.R. §§ 970.2401-2402 (1981), at § 970.2401(g)(3) [hereinafter cited as
Pre-EnactmentExplorers Regulations]. Because paragraphs (A) and (B) of the Act describe
individual United States citizens and corporate or other business entities "organized or
existing under the laws of any of the United States," respectively, the resulting jurisdictional
assertion might potentially extend to non-domesticatedforeign corporations whose "controlling interest" (liberally defined by § 4(3) of the Act to include "a direct or indirect legal or
beneficial interest in or influence over another person arising through ownership of capital
stock, interlocking directorates or officers, contractual relations, or other similar means,
which substantially affect the independent business behavior of such person") is held by a
domesticated foreign corporation (emphasis added). If enforced to its ultimate extension,
however, it is doubtful that international judicial comity could be expected in non-reciprocating states, leaving the United States to apply whatever sanctions are available to it. See,
e.g., British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., [1953] 1 Ch. 19,
[1952] 2 All E.R. 780, [1952] W.N. 469; Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy, Judgment of May 22,
1965, Cour d'appel, Paris, 14e Ch., reprinted in 5 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 476 (1965). See also the
recent legislative response of the British Parliament to attempted extraterritorial applications
reflected in the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c.11, in force March 20, 1980,
discussed in Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); but see Lowenfeld, Sovereignty,
Jurisdiction,and Reasonableness:A Reply to A. V. Lowe, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 629 (1981). This
realization, coupled with an awareness of the potential of an overly exuberant jurisdictional
policy to erode the credibility of the United States freedom-of-the-seas position perceived in
broader context, will hopefully temper the urge to apply the jurisdictional grant as broadly as
it may be construed.
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exploration4 phase of the seabed mining venture. 5 Regulations
concerning the commercial recovery phase, which the Act permits
to commence after January 1, 1988,6 are currently scheduled for
promulgation in 1984. 7 In promulgating regulations pursuant to
4. § 4(5) of the Act, supra note 1, defines exploration to consist of:
(A) [Any at-sea observation and evaluation activity which has, as its objective, the
establishment and documentation of(i) The nature, shape, concentration, location, and tenor of a hard mineral
resource; and
(ii) The environmental, technical, and other appropriate factors which must be
taken into account to achieve commercial recovery; and
(B) The taking from the deep seabed of such quantities of any hard mineral resource
as are necessary for the design, fabrication, and testing of equipment which is
intended to be used in the commercial recovery and processing of such resource.
§ 101(a)(2) of the Act, then exempts from its prohibited activites:
(A) Scientific research ....
(B) Mapping, or the taking of any geophysical, geochemical, oceanographic, or
atmospheric measurements or random bottom samplings of the deep seabed, if such
taking does not significantly alter the surface or subsurface of the deep seabed or
significantly affect the environment.
(C) The design, construction, or testing of equipment and facilities . . . if such
design, construction, or testing is conducted on shore, or does not involve the
recovery of any but incidental hard mineral resources.
These exceptions may tend to partially impugn the more general prohibitions contained in §
4(5)(A), especially during the exploration phase.
5. As used in this article, seabed mining refers exclusively to the recovery of hard
mineral resources from areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Hard mineral resources are defined by the Act to consist of "any deposit or accretion on, or just below, the
surface of the deep seabed of nodules which include one or more minerals, at least one of
which contains manganese, nickel, cobalt, or copper .... "Act, supra note 1, § 4(6); see also
§ 970.10(j) of the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Deep Seabed Mining RegulationsforExploration Licenses, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,890-45,920
(September 15, 1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.100), reprintedin 20 Int'l Legal Mat.
1228 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Regulations]. Concerning the strategic and economic value
of nodule recovery, see, e.g., J. Mero, THE MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE SEA 127-30 (1965);
NOAA, Deep Seabed Mining: Final Draft ProgrammaticEnvironmental Impact Statement
5-9 (September 1981); Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation oj Deep
Seabed Mineral Resources by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 339-44 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as UnilateralExploitation of the Deep Seabed]. Concerning the legality of
unilateral nodule recovery generally, see id. at 350-94; T. Kronmiller, THE LAWFULNESS OF
SEABED MINING passim (1980); Arrow, The Customary Norm Processand the Deep Seabed, 9
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as The Customary Norm Processand the
Deep Seabed].
6. Act, supra note 1, § 102(c)(1)(D).
7. NOAA, Deep Seabed Mining Public Hearings at 6 (Washington, D.C., May 8, 1981)
(statement of Robert Knecht). This hearing was the fourth of four conducted by NOAA
between April 24 and May 8, 1981 concerning a preliminary version of the Exploration
Licensing Regulations which it promulgated on March 24. See ProposedRules, Deep Seabed
Mining Regulationsfor Exploration Licenses, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,448-18,475 (March 24, 1981)
(proposed 15 C.F.R. Part 970). [hereinafter cited as Proposed Regulations]. These proposals
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the Act, NOAA has not only regulated the fledgling American
seabed mining industry" but has also provide it with an expansible
degree of protection from the uncertainty of future seabed regimes." This article will attempt both to describe the evolution
effected by the regulations upon the United States' "alternative"
seabed mining regime, and to explore some of the international
consequences flowing therefrom.
I. PRE-ENACTMENT EXPLORERS
A. The November 1980 Regulations
The first set of regulations, which was made effective upon its
publication on November 20, 1980, affected only those citizens who
had engaged in exploration activities prior to the passage of the Act
on June 28, 1980, and who intend to apply for an explcration
license under the Act. Such citizens are exempted by the Act' 0 from
its prohibition" against either exploration or commercial recovery
of seabed hard minerals without an NOAA-issued exploration li-

evolved, inter alia, from responses generated by NOAA to its notice of proposed rulemaking
(45 Fed. Reg. 79,089 (1980), from comments submitted in response to NOAA's "major issues"
paper of November 28, 1980, id. and from a public hearing held in Washington, D.C., on
December 17, 1980. The hearings held subsequent to the publication of the ProposedRegulations were conducted on April 24 (Honolulu, Hawaii) (two sessions), April 28 (San Francisco,
California), and May 8 (Washington, D.C.). [These hearings will hereinafter be cited as the
First, Second, Third and FourthHearing respectively. Since they remain unpublished as this
article goes to press, the page numbers cited correspond to the pagination of the original
hearing transcripts (copies on file with the author)].
8. Historically, there have been four consortia with United States corporations participating, all of which are expected to apply for exploration licenses. The Kennecott Corporation consortium, formed in January of 1974, consists of Kennecott Corporation and Noranda
Exploration, Inc., of the United States; the Mitsubishi Corp. of Japan; and B.P. Petroleum
Div., Ltd., Consolidated Gold Fields, Ltd., and R.T.Z. Deep Sea Mining Enterprises, Ltd.,
all of the United Kingdom. Ocean Minerals Company (OMCO), formed in November of
1974, consists of subsidiaries of Lockheed Corp., Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., and
Standard Oil Co. of Indiana of the United States; and BRW Ocean Minerals and a subsidiary
of Royal Dutch Shell of the Netherlands. Ocean Mining Associates (OMA), also formed in
November, 1974, consists of subsidiaries of Tenneco Corp., U.S. Steel Corp., and Sun Oil
Co. of the United States; Union Miniere of Belgium; and Samin Ocean, Inc., a subsidiary of
the Italian government. Ocean Management, Inc. (OMI), formed in May 1975, consists of
Sedco, Inc., of the United States; INCO, Ltd., of Canada; Deep Ocean Mining Co., Ltd., of
Japan; and AMR West German Companies (an aggregate) of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
9. See note 26, infra.
10. Act supra note 1, § 101(b).
11. Id. § 101(a).
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cense or commercial recovery permit. Those citizens may continue
exploration pending final determination of their exploration license
applications.' 2 This legislative exemption directly benefits pre-enactment explorers because their right to continue exploration is
recognized while other parties will likely be required to wait until
mid-1983 to obtain exploration licenses.1 3 The regulations both
create a permissive' 4 procedure by which a party claiming pre-en-

actment explorer status may file written notice of its claim to the
Administrator of NOAA, and describe the information deemed
relevant to the perfecting of a claim to such status.15 The regulations specify that this procedure fills a notice function only, and
does not operate as a substitute for an exploration license application. '6
Even qualified pre-enactment explorers are required to provide notice to NOAA concerning the timing and nature of exploration voyages not later than 45 days prior to the scheduled embarkation date, 17 and must submit a post-voyage environmental report

12. Id. § 101(b)(l)(b).
13. The final exploration regulations were issued September 15, 1981. NOAA officials
are now assuming somewhere around a six month lag time between that date and the
opening date for receipt of new exploration license applications, a date therefore unlikely to
be prior to early 1982. See, e.g., Third Hearing, supra note 7, at 33, 34; Fourth Hearing,
supra note 7, at 7 (statements of Robert Knecht); see also text accompanying note 48, infra.
Certification will normally occur within 100 days after the application is complete. Act,
supra note 1, § 103(g); Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,920 (1981) (to be codified
in 15 C.F.R. § 970.400(c)). The Administrator will then propose license terms within 180
days, id. § 970.500(b), with a final determination required at the end of another 180-day
period, id. § 970.500(c). Thus, a late 1983 licensing date for new (non-pre-enactment)
explorers appears to be a somewhat reasonable expectation. Concerning the possible ameliorating effect that § 101(a)(2) of the Act, supra note 1, has on new explorers, however, see note
4, supra.
14. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2402(a) (1981).
15. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2402(b) (1981) requests the notifying party to specify the names
and addresses of citizens responsible for exploration, as well as a further description including
the place of incorporation, if any, of the notifying party; the places where the party does
business; certification of the essential and non-proprietary provisions in the charter, articles
of incorporation or articles of association, if any; and the membership of participants if the
notifying party is an association, partnership, or joint venture. In addition, the notifying
party is requested to specify a general description of all exploration activities which occured
prior to the passage of the Act on June 28, 1980, including their dates and approximate costs,
but excluding any information concerning the location of past or future exploration or
prospective mine sites. Finally, the notifying party is requested to inform NOAA concerning
its intention to apply for an exploration license.
16. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2402(a) (1981).
17. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2501 (1981).
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within 30 days after its conclusion. 18 A procedure is provided for
evaluating the confidentiality of any information submitted, 9 and
the Administrator of NOAA is authorized to suspend any exploration voyage when necessary to prevent a significant adverse effect
20
on the environment.
Except insofar as they reiterate definitions and substantive

conclusions dictated by the Act, 2 ' the November, 1980 regulations,
in short, are exclusively procedural. Moreover, not only the form,
but the necessity of the Notice of Pre-enactment Exploration provided by § 970,2402 of the Regulations were recommendatory only

as of that time. 22 Although the absence of any procedure in the
regulations for a prior determination concerning the confidentiality
of information submitted has proven controversial, that defect has

18. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2502 (1981).
19. Essentially, 15 C.F.R. § 970.2602 (1981) requires that material as to which confidential treatment is requested be clearly identified as such, and that the basis for such request
(trade secret or other privilege) also be identified. Further relevant issues to be addressed in
the written confidentiality request include the nature of the competitive advantage involved,
the competitive harm of dissemination, the extent of past disseminations and access, and past
measures taken to prevent dissemination. No determination of the substantive validity of the
confidentiality request, however, is to be made until after a request for disclosure, pursuant
to 15 C.F.R. Part 903, has been made. This last provision, it will be noted, has been
subjected to serious industry criticism, especially as repromulgated in § 970.902(c)(3) of the
more generally applicable Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 184,466 (1981).
As a result, the Regulations, supra note 5, have been modified to allow in § 970.902(b)(4) for
the possibility of a binding written confirmation of oral NOAA guidance in advance of any
request for disclosure, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,910 (1981). This issue will be discussed further in the
text accompanying notes 134-147, infra.
20. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2503 (1981). This clause implements the broad analagous authority
delegated the Administrator by § 106(c) of the Act, supra note 1. The criteria for and
procedural guarantees affecting non-emergency suspensions and other modifications in exploration license conditions are controlled primarily by § 105(c) and §, 106 of the Act. Finally,
the Administrator is also authorized by § 106(a)(2)(B) of the Act to suspend or modify
particular activities under any license or permit if the President determines that such action is
necessary:
(i)to avoid any conflict with any international obligation of the United States
established by any treaty or convention in force with respect to the United States, or
(ii) to avoid any situation which may reasonably be expected to lead to a breach of
international peace and security involving armed conflict.
21. Comparee.g., Act, supra note 1, at § 4, with 15 C.F.R. § 970.2401 (1981) of the
Pre-EnactmentExplorer Regulations, supra note 3; but c.f. 15 C.F.R. § 970.2401(b) (1981),
which allows the Administrator of NOAA to appoint a designee to act for him in administering the Act. No such authority may be found in § 4(12) of the Act. See also Regulations, supra
note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,897 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.101(b)).
22. See note 14 supra; but see the text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
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been eliminated by the September, 1981 Exploration License Regulations .23
Finally, despite questions concerning the wisdom of allowing
pre-enactment explorers to continue exploring with both temporarily minimal regulation 24 and a two year "head start, ' 25 at least
three broad policy considerations tend to support this legislative
judgment. First, the seabed mining industry, which has been operating in the context of arguably the least settled of all legal regimes, 26 is urgently in need of at least a tentative security of tenure27 in order to justify the sizable investment required by the
nature of the seabed mining venture.2 8 The Act's exemption of
pre-enactment explorers from an enforced exploratory hiatus, at
the least, precludes interference with whatever security now exists,
and tends to reward those explorers who entered the field at the
time of the greatest economic risk. Second, given the significance of
the legislatively determined national interest in assuring "the availability of hard mineral resources .. . independent of the export
policies of foreign nations,"' 2 and the potential pitfalls of regulating
or licensing in haste, a two year period of minimal regulation for a
limited number30 of pre-enactment explorers seems a reasonable
compromise designed to permit both administrative reflection and
continued technological development. Finally, because the regula-

23. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,910 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.902(b)(4)); see also note 19 supra.
24. After the scheduled promulgation of Subpart C of the Exploration License Regulations later this year, even pre-enactment explorers will be subject to the license conditions
and restrictions described in Section II-D, infra. In addition, the Administrator enjoys the
powers described in notes 17-20 supra, over pre-enactment explorers even prior to licensing.
25. See note 13 supra.
26. See, e.g., Unilateral Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 405-06;
Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, 8 OCEAN & Dev. INT'L L. J. 223
(1980); but see, The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, supra note 5 at 12-38.
27. "[A]fter ten years, it will take about seven years of full operation to recover your
initial investment. So, we have a seventeen year period in which it is absolutely necessary to
have ... a stable legal regime, regardless of whether the legal regime itself. . .[is] extremely
favorable or just marginally favorable. So far, the most important thing is that it not
change ...." Third Hearing, supra note 7 at 31 (statement of Conrad Welling); see also
Fourth Hearing, supra note 7 at 4 (statement of Robert Knecht).
28. An amount of available risk capital in excess of one billion dollars has been estimated to be required. First Hearing, supra note 7, at 19 (statement of Hideto Kono). The
need for sufficient capital is underscored by the "financial capability" requirements of
§ 103(c)(1) of the Act, supra note 1.
29. Id., § 2(a)(3).
30. See note 8, supra.
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tions actually authorized "[t]he taking from the deep seabed of such
quantities of any hard mineral resource as are necessary for the

design, fabrication, and testing of equipment ... ,,,31 by pre-enactment explorers in 1980, the exemption and its corresponding
regulations provided immediate reaffirmation, in a more than "paper" fashion, of the United States protest against the erosion of the
freedom-of-the-seas principle by the proposed "common heritage/

32
common property" regime.

B. Prospectsfor Future Regulation
When NOAA promulgated the Proposed Exploration License
Regulations3 3 on March 24, 1981, Subpart C 34 thereof was designed
to complete the establishment of the legal regime affecting pre-enactment explorers which the November, 1980 regulations had begun. Although NOAA has temporarily reserved issuance of this
subpart, due primarily to the need to synchronize U.S. dispute-settlement procedures with those of potentially reciprocating states, 35
31. Pre-EnactmentExplorer Regulations, supra note 3, 45 Fed. Reg. 76,662 (1980) (to
be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.2401(e)(2) (1981)).
32. The currently-proposed application of the common heritage principle to the deep
seabed is contained in the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra preliminary title
footnote * p. 1. For discussions of that proposed regime, see generally, Unilateral Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 394-414; Caron, Municipal Legislation for the
Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 259 (1980); Prospective
Impacts of the Draft Sea Convention, supra preliminary title footnote * p. 1. See also text
accompanying notes 147-52, infra.
33. See note 7, supra.
34. Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,457-18,458 (1981) (proposed
15 C.F.R. § 990.300-302).
35. § 118 of the Act, supra note 1, allows the Administrator, upon consultation, to
designate a foreign state as a "reciprocating state" with consequent mutual license recognition if the foreign state regulates its nationals in a manner compatible with the Act, recognizes U.S. licenses and priorities, and provides an interim framework for exploration and
exploitation which does not unreasonably interfere with the exercise of other states' freedoms
of the seas. To date, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany have passed
legislation which may qualify for such status. See, Federal Republic of Germany, Act of
Interim Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining, Bundesgesetzblatt, Part I, 9080, No. 50 (August
22, 1980), at 1457, unofficial translationappearsat 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 393 (1981); United
Kingdom: Deep Sea Mining (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1981 Chapter 53, July 28, 1981,
reprinted in 20 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 1217 (1981). Pursuant to § 118(f) of the U.S. Act, supra
note 1, both NOAA and the Department of State Law of the Sea Office are currently
conducting negotiations with these and other states. The difficulty of a non-synchronous
dispute resolution procedure was expressed in the Hearings as follows:
The way the present structure [is set] forth in the proposed regulations .. .[there
are] rigid time periods during which conflict resolution will take place in the United
States.

"ALTERNATIVE" SEABED MINING REGIME
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the subpart's contents, coupled with the substantive requirements
of the Act, provide some illumination concerning prospects for the
eventual regulatory approach.
Section 101(b) of the Act authorizes the Administrator to prescribe a reasonable period of time after promulgation of the regulations during which pre-enactment explorers must file to preserve
their rights to uninterrupted exploration and priority of right. 36
The proposed regulations required that notice of any claim to preenactment explorer status be filed within twenty days and that a
license application be filed within ninety days of the regulations'
publication date. 37 Applications not filed within the ninety day
period would not be deemed to be based on pre-enactment exploration.3 8 The disability thus produced by late application would be
critical because the Act, in cases involving conflicting applications
for the same exploration area, applies different selection criteria to
pre-enactment explorers and new explorers. Regarding pre-enactment explorers, the Act provides:
The timely filing of any applicationfor a license ... shall
entitle the applicantto priority of right for the issuance of such
license . . . . In any case in which more than one application
[based on pre-enactment exploration] . . . is filed . . . which

refer to all or part of the same deep seabed area, the Administrator shall, in taking action on such applications, apply principles
of equity which take into consideration,among other things, the
date on which the applicants or predecessors in interest, or
component organizations thereof, commenced exploration ac-

tivities and the continuity and extent of such exploration and
amount of funds expended .... "
In the ... discussions that have been going on among the reciprocating states,
[there is] a different time frame.
From a lawyer's point of view, I could not help but be concerned by a situation
in which my client would be involved in a domestic conflict situation with witnesses
much of
on the record explaining the entire theory of a number of years' work ....
which could be related to the defense of another mine site.
I think any U.S. company would be prejudiced where . . . [it has] to face a
domestic conflict first on the record and then move several months later into an
international procedure in which substantial information would be heard.
Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 33-35 (statement of Alan Kauffman).
36. Act, supra note 1, §§ 101(b)(l)(A), 101(b)(3).
37. Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,457 (1981) (proposed 15
C.F.R. § 970.301).
38. Id.
39. Act, supra note 1, § 101(b)(3) (emphasis added).
S..
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As to new explorers, the Act provides that priority shall be established ".

.

. on the basis of the chronologicalorder in which license

applications which are in substantial compliance with the requirements [of the Act and its implementing regulations] . . .are filed
with the Administrator. ' 40 The proposed regulation just described

was reserved, along with the remainder of Subpart C, and is thus
not as yet in force as of the date this article goes to press. Nevertheless, the establishment, in some manner, of a "cut-off" date for the
assertion of pre-enactment equities is a condition precedent to ultimately licensing new explorers through the chronological process
described above. Similar provisions may be reasonably anticipated,
therefore, in the final version of Subpart C, when promulgated.
Timely filing of the claims and license applications of pre-enactment explorers will likely be required to preserve their license priorities and uninterrupted exploration rights.
In addition to the notice and application requirements described above, proposed Subpart C contained criteria for resolving
conflicting claims between pre-enactment explorers 41 and the
process by which the resolution was to be achieved. 42 Since the
primary equitable principles to be applied to such disputes are
specified by the Act, 43 the final version of Subpart C will certainly
remain substantively unchanged in this respect.
Concerning the dispute resolution process, the proposed regulations provided for notification by NOAA to affected parties of the
existence of a conflict, 44 voluntary resolution by compromise, 45 and

finally for either a binding dispute settlement mechanism of the
parties' choice or resolution by the Administrator. 46 Although it is
still too early to predict the outcome of the reciprocating states'
negotiations concerning an issue as sensitive as dispute resolution, it
is likely that the final process will incorporate due process-type

40. Act, supra note 1, § 103(b) (emphasis added).
41. Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,458 (1981) (proposed 15
C.F.R. § 970.302(c)).
42. Id. § 970.302(a) (b).
43. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
44. Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,457 (1981) (proposed 15
C.F.R. § 970.302(a)(2)).
45. Id. § 970.302(a)(3),(d).
46. Id. § 970.302(b).
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safeguards similar to the ones contained in the proposed regula47
tions.
In any case, one of the obvious consequences of NOAA's deci-

sion to reserve Subpart C is that NOAA will accept no exploration
license applications until after Subpart C has been promulgated. 48

II. REGULATIONS AFFECTING ALL EXPLORERS
As has been indicated, both pre-enactment explorers 49 and
prospective new entrants50 are required to apply for exploration
licenses pursuant to the Act. Although pre-enactment explorers are
entitled to initial license priority and uninterrupted exploration, the
advantage created by these rights terminates either upon the issuance of the license, or upon the final administrative or judicial
decision affirming its denial. 5' Due to the reservation of Subpart
C, all the license regulations promulgated by NOAA on September
15, 1981 are of general applicability.
Because the regulations are extensive, no attempt is made to

discuss all of their due process-oriented procedural provisions.
Rather, the discussion will be directed towards their substantive
determinations and criteria, and to those of the procedures which

47. One provision not likely to survive revision is the proposed provision by virtue of
which the Administrator would review a license application involved in a conflict only if "the
applicant advises the Administrator in writing that loss of the area in conflict will not
materially affect the applicant's ability to perform the exploration program set forth in his
application". Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,458 (1981) (proposed 15
C.F.R. § 970.302(a)(4)(iii)(B)). This provision was criticized in the Hearings as putting a
pre-enactment explorer involved in an area dispute on the horns of a dilemma: either it
admits that the loss of the area in conflict will not affect its ability to perform (arguably an
admission that the disputed area was not part of the logical mining unit to begin with) or it
declines the admission at the cost of having its license application delayed. Fourth Hearing,
supra note 7, at 17-18 (statement of Jeffrey Amsbaugh); see also id. at 24 (statement of Robert
Knecht). Concerning the similarly controversial voluntary "resolution by subunit" approach
contained in § 970.302(d) of the Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,458
(1981); see generally Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 18-19 (statement of Jeffrey Amsbaugh); id. at 25 (statement of Robert Knecht); id. at 25-26 (statement of Brooks Bowen); id.
at 26 (statement of Fred Ritts).
48. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,902 (1981); see also 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.200(e)(4) (1981). Since a qualified pre-enactment explorer is given an absolute right to
a license in areas in which it can establish superior equity, the claims of such explorers must
be established prior to general licensing.
49. Act, supra note 1, § 101(b)(1)(A).
50. Id.§ 101(a)(1).
51. Id.§ 101(b)(1)(B).
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are of primary and general applicability. 52 The approach taken
will initially be chronological, tracing the regulations' impact on
the application, certification, and issuance stages of the licensing
procedure, and their further impact on the nature of licensees'

continuing obligations. The important related issue concerning
confidentiality is given separate treatment at the end of this section.
A. Application
Applications must be submitted in the form and manner prescribed by Subpart B of the regulations.5 3 NOAA will be available
for pre-application consultations with prospective applicants concerning the requirements of both Subparts B and C, and is authorized to provide written confirmation of any proffered oral guid54
ance given.
detail the information required to be submitted, which must be
sufficient to document the applicant's ownership, 55 its financial 5

and technical 57 capabilities, the safety 58 and environmental sound-

52. By virtue of this admittedly somewhat arbitrary taxonomy, §§ 970.211-213, §§
970.501-.502, § 970.905, all of Subpart J, and all of Subpart K except for §§ 970.1103-1106
of the Regulations, supra note 5, will be excluded from discussion in this article.
53. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,898 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
t ,70.200(a)).
54. Id. § 970.200(d).
55. Id. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,900 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.206).
56. In furtherance of the diligence requirements of the Act, the Regulations, supra note
5, specify that submitted information must show that the applicant is reasonably capable of
committing or raising sufficient resources. 46 Fed. Reg. 45,899 (1981) (to be codified in 15
C.F.R. § 970.201(a)). The estimated cost and financing plan must be detailed. Applicants are
required to submit the most recently audited financial statement and credit bond rating of
themselves, and of such financing entities as will be relied upon to finance exploration. The
most recent annual report and S.E.C. Form 10-K will suffice for publicly held companies.
Id. § 970.201(b).
57. In providing the Administrator with a basis for determining whether the applicant
technically has the capacity to explore in an environmentally sensitive manner, the applicant
is permitted to present technological knowledge and skills to which it can demonstrate access
as well as that which it currently possesses. Id. § 970.202(b).
58. U.S. flag vessels in excess of 300 tons are required to possess a current Coast Guard
Certificate of Inspection, and must satisfy all other federal inspection statutes, some of which
are listed in Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,909 (1981) (to be codified in 15
C.F.R. § 970.801). Foreign flag vessels are required to satisfy either the SOLAS 74, SOLAS
60, or International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) certificate requirements.
Id. § 970.205 of the Regulations requires that relevant supporting documentation be furnished with the application, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,900 (1981). See also Act, supra note 1, § 112(b).
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ness5 9 of its exploration, any known conflicting oceanic uses,60 and
the possible antitrust ramifications of any exploration in which it
62
engages. 6' The applicant is required to submit a $100,000 fee.
Both the Act 6 3 and Regulations6 4 require the submission of a
general exploration plan. The contents of the required exploration
plan are specified by the Act:
(B) The exploration plan for a license shall set forth the
activities proposed to be carried out during the period of the
license, describe the area to be explored, and include the in-

59. Act, supra note 1, § 109(d) subjects the license issuance process to § 102 of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1976)). In order to develop the site-specific environmental
impact statement required by those provisions, NOAA has requested that physical, chemical,
and biological information be submitted for the exploration area. While § 970.204 of the
Regulationscontains a statement of the legal requirements, a Technical Guidance Document
has been issued to specify the details concerning the necessary monitoring and information.
This document is not intended to carry its own force of law. See Fourth Hearing, supra note
7, at 23 (statement of James Lawless); see generally Third Hearing, supra note 7, at 47
(statement of Robert Knecht).
60. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,900 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.204(b)).
61. Section 103(d) of the Act, supra note 1, specifically provides for antitrust review of
applications by the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission. In order to provide
for this review, § 970.207(b) of the Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,900 (1981),
requires that applicants identify themselves, their affiliates, and their form of doing business.
In addition, each applicant, affiliate, or parent or subsidiary of an affiliate which is actually
engaged in production in, or the purchase or sale to the United States of any of the four
involved metals or their derivatives is required to specify, pursuant to §970.207(b)(3) of the
Regulations, the annual dollar value of their purchase, sale, or production during the
preceding two years; to produce copies of the preceding two years' annual reports, balance
sheets, and income statements; and to submit copies of each document submitted to the
S.E.C. Earlier proposed regulations requiring market studies, surveys, and other memoranda
on seabed mining prospects, as well as supplementary information on request, were eliminated as overly burdensome, and as tending to require the production of proprietary information. See Regulations, supra note 5, at Supplementary Information, 9-10. See also Fourth
Hearing, supra note 7, at 16 (statement of Jeffrey Amsbaugh); id. at 36 (statement of Alan
Kauffman).
62. Section 970.208(b) of the Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,901 (1981),
also provides for cost adjustments in case of variation in administrative costs, and permits a
reduced fee, determined by preapplication consultation as provided by § 970.200(d), to
transfer applicants who have previously been found qualified for licensing. These provisions
demonstrate NOAA's efforts to implement in good faith the Act's requirement that the fee
imposed "shall reflect the reasonable administrative costs incurred in reviewing and processing the application." Act, supra note 1, § 104.
63. Act, supra note 1, § 103(a)(2)(B), (D).
64. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,899 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.203).
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tended exploration schedule and methods to be used, the development and testing of systems for commercial recovery to take
place under the terms of the license, an estimated schedule of
expenditures, measures to protect the environment and to monitor the effectiveness of environmental safeguards and monitoring systems for commercial recovery, and such other information as is necessary and appropriate to carry out the provisions of
this title. The area set forth in an exploration plan shall be of
sufficient size to allow for intensive exploration.
(D) The applicant shall select the size and location of the
area of the exploration plan . . . which . . . shall be approved
unless the Administrator finds that(i) the area is not a logical mining unit; or
(ii) commercial recovery activities in the proposed location
would result in a significant adverse impact on the quality of the
environment which cannot be avoided by the imposition of reasonable restrictions.6 5
The required contents of the exploration plan are implemented
by § 970.203(b) of the Regulations. In addition, they serve to clarify
several important issues left unsettled by the Act and the Proposed
Regulations.
First, the regulations make clear that the certification of the

area chosen by the applicant as constituting a "logical mining unit"
will be performed by NOAA on a case-by-case basis,66 exclusively
according to the criteria provided in the Act:
In the case of an exploration license, a logical mining unit is
an area of the deep seabed which can be explored under the
license, and within the ten-year license period, in an efficient,
economical and orderly mannei with due regard for conservation and protection of the environment, taking into consideration the resource data, other relevant physical and environmental characteristics, and the state of the technology of the
applicant as set forth in the exploration plan. In addition, it
must be of sufficient size to allow for intensive exploration. 7

65. Act, supra note 1, § 103(a)(2)(B), (D) (emphasis added).
66. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,907 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.601(b)).
67. Id. § 970.601(a). This subsection, with the exception of the ten-year proviso,
restates the criteria specified by §§ 103(a)(2)(E)(i), 103(a)(2)(B) of the Act, supra note 1. The
ten-year condition is apparently in furtherance of the diligence requirements of § 108 of the
Act, and will be discussed further in the text accompanying note 68, infra. See also Act, §
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Second, the regulations clarify that although applicants will
have to demonstrate that the 10-year license period will likely be
sufficient to enable them to apply for and obtain a commercial
recovery permit, they will not have to demonstrate the likelihood of
actual commercial recovery by that time.68
Third, they render the required exploration schedule sufficiently flexible to take into account the different technologies and
chronologies employed by different applicants 9 whose technologies
the regulations permit to be mutually supportive for license application purposes. 70 Furthermore, the final regulations were also
modified to specify that, at the time of application, descriptions of
planned designs and tests of commercial recovery systems could be
71
general.
Fourth, in response to comment, 72 NOAA has specifically recognized that the submitted exploration plan may contain a retrospective (and supporting) element in the form of a description of
any exploration and prospecting work completed prior to applica73
tion.
The date of submission of a substantially7 4 complete applica-

tion determines the priority of right for new entrants. 7

The appli-

cation is ready for certification when complete.

107(a). The Proposed Regulations contained a rebuttable presumption that logical mining
units would not exceed 80,000 sq. km. In recognition, inter alia, of the relationship of any
presumed size to conflict resolution among pre-enactment explorers' applications, NOAA
decided to at least temporarily delete this reference, pending possible repromulgation of this
or another presumptive figure if made necessary by the dispute settlment procedures eventually agreed to by the reciprocating states. See Regulations, supra note 5, at Supplementary
Information 14-15. See also note 35, supra.
68. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,899 (1981) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.203(a)).
69. Id. § 970.203(b)(3).
70. See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,899 (1981) (to be codified in 15
C.F.R. § 970.202(a)); see also note 57 supra.
71. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,899 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.203(b)(5)).
72. See, e.g., Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 14-15 (statement of Jeffrey Amsbaugh).
73. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,900 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.203(b)(8)); see also, Regulations, supra note 5, at Supplementary Information 16.
74. The "substantial compliance" provisions and procedures are contained in Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,901 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.209(b)).
75. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,901 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.210); see also Act, supra note 1 § 103(b).
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B. Certification
Certification is an intermediate step between application and
actual issuance or transfer which focuses solely on the applicant's
eligibility.7 6 The Act requires the Administrator to certify an application upon his making the requisite determinations and findings
described above.7 7 If certification has not been completed within
100 days after submission of the application, the Administrator is
required to give written notice to the applicant of the unresolved
issues, the Administrator's efforts to resolve them, and an estimate
of the time required to do so. 7 81 Before certification, the Administrator must determine that issuance would not violate any of the
restrictions of §102(c) of the Act, 79 and must make further findings,

upon consultation, concerning the applicant's financial8" and technological 8' capabilities and fulfillment of all previous license and
permit obligations, if any. 82 In addition, the Administrator is
required to make written determinations concerning fee payment,8 3
and the legal adequacy of the applicant's proposed exploration
plan 84 and designated site. 85 Denial of certification is subject to
judicial review, 8 6 and may occur for failure to satisfy any of the
requirements described above, 87 or for prospective inability to meet
any of the further requirements for issuance contained in § 105(a)
of the Act.
76. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,902 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.400(a)).
77. See text accompanying notes 53-71 supra; Act supra note 1, § 103(g).
78. Id.; see also Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,902 (1981) (to be codified in
15 C.F.R. § 970.400(c)).
79. Section 102(c) of the Act, supra note 1, deals primarily with licenses which would
be duplicitous, either internally, or in the context of reciprocating states' licenses. Also
precluded are the issuance of licenses to non "citizens," see note 3, supra, terminated
licensees, or subsequent to United States ratification of a conflicting treaty. Also relevant is
the restriction against the issuance of any commercial recovery permit until January 1, 1988.
See also Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,902 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.401(b)).
80. Id. § 970.401; see also note 56, supra.
81. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,902 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.404); see also note 57 supra.
82. Id., § 970.403.
83. Id. § 970.406; see also note 62, supra.
84. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,902 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.404); see also text accompanying notes 65-73 supra.
85. Id., § 970.405; see also text accompanying notes 66, 67, supra.
86. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,903 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.407(f)).
87. See notes 79-85, supra.

1981]

"ALTERNATIVE" SEABED MINING REGIME

17

If, in the course of reviewing an application for certification,
the Administrator becomes aware of the fact that one or more of
the requirements for issuance or transfer under §§ 970.503 through
970.507 will not be met, he may also deny certification of the
application. 8 The substance of the requirements alluded to tends
to focus on more internationally oriented issues, upon which the
minimal information"9 submitted by the applicant is not expected
to be sufficient for resolution. For that reason discussion of these
issues will be deferred to the next subsection concerning the issuance stage, during which the factual context surrounding these
issues will be more completely developed.

C. Issuance
Normally within 180 days following certification, the Administrator will propose and publish" license terms, conditions, and
restrictions for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the dili94
9 3
gence, 9 l conservation ,92 safety at sea, and freedom-of-the-seas
requirements of the Act. The regulations require that all proposed
and final terms, conditions, and restrictions be uniform, except as

88. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,900 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.407(a) (emphasis added). The authority for this provision may be found in §§ 103(g),
106(a) of the Act, supra note 1. Sections 970.503 to 970.507, alluded to in the text, state the
criteria found in § 105(a) of the Act.
89. The applicant will, of course, have submitted information concerning known competing uses pursuant to § 970.204(b) of the Regulations, which may relate to the Administrator's judgment in applying § 970.503(c) and § 970.505. It will also have supplied some
environmental data pursuant to § 970.203-.204 which may be relevant to the Administrator's
judgment in applying § 970.506. It will also have submitted vessel safety information
pursuant to § 970.205 which is clearly relevant to the Administrator's judgment in applying §
970.507. Nevertheless, no data concerning § 970.504, and only incomplete data concerning
the requirements of §§ 970.503, .505 and .506 are required to be submitted in the application. The cautious language of § 970.407(a), quoted in the text accompanying note 88,
presumably reflects this recognition. See also text accompanying note 95 infra.
90. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,903 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.500(b)(1)).
91. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.517).
92. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §§ 970.518-.520, .522-.523).
93. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.521).
94. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.520). Concerning the extent to which the
freedom-of-the-seas principle mandates the environmental concern reflected in sections
970.518-520, .522-.523 of the Regulations, see, e.g., Unilateral Exploitation of the Deep
Seabed, supra note 5, at 359-60,365-68, 390-93; The Customary Norm Process and the Deep
Seabed, supra note 5, at 16-21, 27.
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required due to differing environmental conditions.9" In addition,
the Administrator is required at this stage to make written findings
of fact upon consultation with interested departments and agencies
pursuant to section 103(e) of the Act, and upon consideration of
public comments concerning the five criteria established by
§ 105(a) of the Act. The substance of these limitations may now be
examined in greater detail.
Section 105(a) of the Act requires written findings by the
Administrator prior to licensing, that the issuance of the license:
(1) will not unreasonably interfere with the exercise of the freedoms of the high seas by other states, as recognized under general principles of international law;
(2) will not conflict with any international obligation of the
United States established by any treaty ...

in force with respect

to the United States;
(3) will not create a situation which may reasonably be expected
to lead to ...

armed conflict;

(4) cannot reasonably be expected to result in a significant adverse effect on the ...

environment ...

; and

(5) will not pose an inordinate threat to the safety of life and
property at sea.96
The first of these conditions is, of course, the preeminent
condition imposed by international law on the exercise of any of the
freedoms of the seas, 97 and therefore constitutes a condition precedent to any valid assertion of rights by the United States pursuant to
that doctrine. In cases involving a competing use of the high seas by
another nation or its nationals, although the regulations encourage
negotiated compromise which maximally permits both uses, failing
such settlement the final discretion regarding the licensing is left
with the Administrator."8 While a statement of factors to be con-

95. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,903 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.500(b)(1).
96. Act, supra note 1, § 105(a).
97. See in this regard art. 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13
U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (in force September 30, 1962) [hereinafter
cited as Convention on the High Seas] which in this regard represents a codification of a
pre-existing norm of customary international law. M. McDOUGAL and W. BURKE, THE
PUBLIC OaDEa OF THE OCFANs 763 (1962).
98. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,903 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.503(c)(2). The role of consultation pursuant to § 103(e) of the Act is left somewhat
unclear by §§ 105(a), 106(a) of the Act.
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sidered was omitted in the final regulations,"9 general reference to
the principles of international law is already mandated by the

Act. 00 Clearly, subordinate factors such as the duration of any
historical usage, abstentions therefrom, and other comparative
equities should be relevant to this determination.
The second required finding concerns the absence of any prior
United States treaty obligation inconsistent with the issuance of a
license.' 0 ' This provision, which ignores international customary
norms, may be criticized as sometimes rendering unavoidable the

commission of an international delict.102 Nevertheless, the provision reflects both American legal dualism 03 in the context of international custom, and a continuing suspicion of interpretations of
the customary norm process based on a "limited sovereignty" prem04
ise. 1
The third required finding involves the avoidance of situations
likely to lead to breach of the peace involving armed conflict. 10
International law also imposes this limitation generally, by virtue,
inter alia of article 33 of the United Nations Charter. The mechanics of the Act seek to preserve the "peaceful settlement" process
both by denying licensing in situations in which a breach of the
peace will likely occur, 0 6 and by limiting the automatic United
0 7
States response to any such breach to diplomatic protection.
Fourth, the Administrator is required to make findings concerning the safety of life and property at sea. 08 The alternative
99. CompareProposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,448, 18,460 (1981)
with Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,903 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §
970.503).
100. Act supra note 1, § 105(a)(1).
101. See Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,904 (1981) (to be codified in 15
C.F.R. § 970.504); Act, supra note 1, § 105(a)(2).
102. See, e.g., UnilateralExploitation of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 388-89; but
see Third Hearing, supra note 7, at 21 (statement of Brooks Bowen).
103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FoRaEaN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITEo
STATES § 3, Comment j (1965); Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925).
104. For an examination of the ripeness of that premise in a public international law
context, see The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 4-9. For an
examination of some of the dangers of its overextension, see Lowenfeld, supra note 3, at
629-38.
105. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,904 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.505); Act, supra note 1, § 105(a)(3).
106. Id.
107. Act, supra note 1, § 3(a)(1)(2).
108. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,904 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.507); Act, supra note 1, § 105(a)(5)).
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SOLAS 60, SOLAS 74, or IACS requirements' 0 9 should provide
adequate basis for this judgment.

Finally, the Administrator must find, prior to licensing, that
the exploration proposed "cannot reasonably be expected to
result in a significant adverse effect on the quality of the environment .... "110 In making this determination, the Administrator is
required to take into account the Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) mandated by § 109(c) of the Act,"' as well
as the site-specific EIS required for each license issuance.1 2 He is
also required to consider the effective scope of the terms, conditions, and restrictions to be imposed, which must include requirements concerning environmental conservation, 13 and an authorization for onboard monitoring by federal observers." 4

Monitoring will focus on the three cumulative effects "1 which
NOAA has determined to have, during the commercial recovery
phase, the potential to create a significant adverse environmental
impact, and a fourth as to which a conclusion has been tentatively

reached."'

NOAA has concluded that although these effects also

109. Regulations, supra note 5,46 Fed. Reg. 45,909 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.801); see also note 58 supra.
110. Act supra note 1, § 105(a)(4); Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,904
(1981), (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.506).
111. NOAA published a Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement in
March, 1981. The final version was released in October, 1981.
112. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,904 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.506).
113. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §§ 970.518-.519).
114. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §§ 970.522, 970.1105). The latter section also
imposes a duty of cooperation on the licensee and vessel operator in connection with the
observer's duties, but correspondingly specifies that the observer will have no authority over
the operation of the vessel or its activities, officers, crew or personnel.
115. Destruction of benthos in and near the collector track; blanketing of benthic fauna
and dilution of food supply away from mine site subareas; and the surface plume effect on
fish larvae. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.701(b)(2)(i)-(iii)). In addition, the effect on
highly migratory species may warrant further study.
116. The fourth effect thought potentially though "remotely" harmful as of March 24,
1981 the potential entry of trace metals from abraded nodules into the food chain through
zooplankton, has been the subject of subsequent review by the National Marine Fisheries
Service. This study concludes that there is a low probability of significant effect from such
trace metals, even at the commercial recovery stage. See ProposedRegulations, supra note 7,
46 Fed. Reg. 18,448, 18,465 (proposed 15 C.F.R. § 970.701(b)(2)); Regulations, supra note
5, at Supplementary Information 16-17. Accordingly, its listing was deleted in the final
regulations, although the trace metal issue will be subject to further study and to monitoring
to verify the preliminary conclusion. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,908 (1981)
(to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.701(b)(2)).
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occur during mining system tests which may be conducted under an
exploration license, 1 7 they are expected to be insignificant at this
stage. 18 The monitoring plans,"' of course, are designed to permit
verification or rebuttal of this important conclusion.
The final decision on license issuance or transfer will normally
be made within 180 days from the date on which the proposed
terms, conditions, restrictions, and the draft site-specific EIS were
published. 2 0 A procedure for objecting to proposed terms, conditions, and restrictions is provided,' 12 although they may be modi-

fied or suspended 2 2 by the Administrator, upon notice and consultation, to insure continued compliance with the requirements of §
23
105(a) of the Act.
D. Continuing Duties
In addition to the obligation to promote environmental monitoring described above, the Act permits the imposition of resource
conservation requirements, as needed, ". . . which have due regard
for the ,prevention of waste and the future opportunity for the
commercial recovery of the unrecovered balance of the hard min-

eral resources in the area

....

124

The Regulations impose the continuing duties to provide verification information,12 5 and to report information concerning con-

117. Specifically, at-sea testing of recovery equipment and the operation of processing
test facilities have been recognized as having "some potential for significant environmental
impacts during exploration." Id. (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 970.701(b)(1)) (emphasis
added).
118. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,908 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.701(b)(2)); see also Regulations, supra note 5, at Supplementary Information, 16.
119. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,908 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.702(a)) provides that a monitoring plan will be included "as part of the terms,
conditions and restrictions developed for each license . . . [to] be based on the monitoring
plan proposed by the applicant and reviewed by NOAA for completeness, accuracy and
statistical reliability."
120. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.) § 970.500(c)).
121. ld. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.510).
122. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. §§ 970.511, 970.512).
123. See text accompanying note 96, supra..
124. Act, supra note 1, § 110. This section also specifies that, "[a]s used in this Act, the
term 'conservation of natural resources' is not intended to grant, imply, or create any
inference of production controls or price regulation ....
" id. (emphasis added).
125. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,909 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.901(a)(2)).
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servation, diligence in the exploration plan and environmental
monitoring at least once a year.120
Finally, the Act requires the Administrator to impose terms,27
conditions, and restrictions to insure diligence in exploration,'
safety at sea,1 28 environmental protection,

29

and reasonable regard

for the exercise by other nations and their nationals of their free130
doms of the seas.
Once issued, licenses are initially valid for 10 years unless
suspended or revoked.' 3' Although licenses may be surrendered at
any time, their surrender does not terminate liability for any violations or penalties incurred. 32 Licensees are required to apply for
license revision in case of a "major change" in the basis for either
33
the certification, transfer, or issuance of a license.1
E. Confidentiality

Under what circumstances are documents and supporting evidence to be considered public record? The Act specifies only that
the Administrator shall provide, upon qualified request, 134 copies of
any document maintained or received by the Administrator, "except that neither the Administrator nor any other officer or employee of the United States may disclose any data or information
knowingly and willingly required under this title the disclosure of
which is prohibited by section 1905 of title 18, United States Code"
126. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.901(b)).
127. The licensee must propose a schedule which will allow completion of exploration
by the end of the 10 year license period. Ultimately, the diligence determination will require
a retrospective judgment by the Administrator, "based on the licensee's reasonable conformance to the approved exploration plan." Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.602(c)).
128. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.521); see also note 58 supra.
129. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,906 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.518); see also text accompanying notes 110-19 supra.
130. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,906 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.520); see also text accompanying notes 97-100 supra.
131. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,906 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.515).
132. Act, supra note 1, § 115. The Regulations, supra note 5, in implementing §§ 302,
106, 306, and 117 of the Act, provide uniform procedures for assessing civil penalties (§§
970.1101-.1102), license sanctions (§ 970.1103), the remission or mitigation of required
forfeitures (§ 970.1104), and notice requirements for parties wishing to bring civil actions
under § 117 of the Act (§ 970.1107).
133. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,905 (1981) (to be codified in 15 C.F.R.
§ 970.513(c)).
134. A request is deemed qualified for these purposes if specific, and made in accordance with rules adopted by the Administrator. Act, supra note 1, § 113(c).
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(the Trade Secrets Act) .1 The Freedom of Information Act is also
residually relevant to any disclosure decision. 3 The procedure for
disclosure tentatively established by the proposed regulations,
which provided that confidentiality determinations would be made
37
only after a disclosure request by a third-party had been made,'
was strongly criticized during the Hearings.' 38 At that time, procedures were suggested both to evaluate the confidentiality of submitted information in advance of third-party request, and to evaluate
such confidentiality in a binding manner, suitable for reliance by
the applicant. Suggested provisions for written confirmation of oral
NOAA guidance given in the preapplication consultation stage' 39
40
were partially incorporated into the final regulations.
The applicant is also required to request confidentiality specifically and in writing.' 4' Such requests may include a statement of
the basis for the claimed confidential treatment and should address
issues concerning:
(i) The commercial or financial nature of the information;
(ii) The nature and extent of the competitive advantage enjoyed
as a result of possession, of the information;

135. Id.
136. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
137. See Proposed Regulations, supra note 7, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,466 (1981) (proposed 15
C.F.R. § 970.902(d)(2)); see also note 19 supra.
138. See Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 45 (statement of Dick Greenwald); id. at
13-14 (statement of Jeffry Amsbaugh);' id. at 36 (statement of Alan Kauffman).
139. See id.
140. See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,910 (1981) (to be codified in
15 C.F.R. § 970.902(b)(4)):
"Normally, NOAA will not make a determination as to whether confidential treatment is warranted until a request for disclosure of the information is received.
However, on a case-by-case basis, the Administrator may decide to make a determination in advance of a request for disclosure, where it would facilitate NOAA's
obtaining voluntarily submitted information (rather than information required to
be submitted under this part)." (emphasis added)
While this regulation stops short of providing advance review upon demand presumably due
to the sheer volume of requests which NOAA would likely be called upon to process (see
Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 46 (statement of Brooks Bowen)), it does provide the
Administrator with sufficient flexibility, especially in light of the vagueness inherent in the
"voluntary - required" distinction, to insure confidentiality in the most pressing cases in
which the claim is substantively justifiable.
141. Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,909-910 (1981) (to be codified in 15
C.F.R. § 970.902(b)(2), (3)).

24

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 5:1

(iii) The nature and extent of the competitive harm which would
result from public disclosure of information;
(iv) The extent to which the information has been disseminated
to employees and contractors of the person submitting the information;
(v) The extent to which persons other than the person submitting
the application possess, or have access to, the same information;
and
(vi) The nature of the measures which have been and are being
taken to protect the information from disclosure.1 42
If no prior confidentiality determination has been made and a
third-party information request is presented, the party requesting
confidential treatment will be provided with notice and the opportunity to comment. The Administrator will then determine
whether confidentiality is warranted, and if not, will provide the
most expeditious notice possible to the party who had requested
it. 143
The confidentiality issue is critical for two reasons. First, as
recognized by the regulations, 144 NOAA must have access to as
much information as possible to ensure compliance with the Act.
This need tends to support the availability of a prior confidentiality
determination as to information helpful to NOAA but not specifically required pursuant to the Act.145 Second, and of greater potential import to the applicant, there remains the need to protect
confidential information for its own intrinsic value, given the competitive nature of the industry involved and the potentially enormous value of the resource deposits involved. Although certain
collateral regulatory provisions furnish some specific protections for
confidential information at various stages of the proceedings, 14 the
more general provisions of § 970.902(d) described above 147 provide
the most certain, and the only prospective method of insuring that
legally protected confidential information will not be disclosed.
142. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.902(c)(2)).
143. Id. (to be codified in 15 C.F.R. § 970.902(d)).
144. See note 140 supra.
145. See, e.g., Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 45 (statement of Dick Greenwald).
146. See, e.g., Regulations, supra note 5, 46 Fed. Reg. 45,920 (1981) (to be codified in
15 C.F.R. § 970.1106). The elimination in the final regulations of requirements for market
studies, surveys, and other memoranda has also tended to ameliorate in part the confidentiality problem. See note 61, supra; Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 42 (statement of Alan
Kauffman).
147. See note 140 supra.
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III. PROSPECTIVE INTERNATIONAL EFFECTS
48
A. The Proposed Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea 1
As has been indicated, the Regulations operate in perhaps the
most unsettled of all areas of international interaction. Whether the
unsettlement is political, legal, or both, depends ultimately on
point of view. 49 In any case, whether the legislative scheme progresses beyond the exploration licensing phase will be determined 5 0
by the ultimate position taken by the United States concerning the
proposed Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea or subsequent
drafts which may be proposed.

148. See preliminary title footnote * supra, p. 1.
149. Concerning the status of the common heritage concept, central to the legal debate,
§ 2(a)(7) of the Act, supra note 1, indicates that:
[T]he United States supported (by affirmative vote) the United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) declaring inter alia the principle that the mineral
resources of the deep seabed are the common heritage of mankind, with the expectation that this principle would be legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive
international Law of the Sea Treaty yet to be agreed upon ....
(emphasis added).
In testimony before a Congressional committee, Ambassador ElliottRichardson in early 1979
responded to an inquiry about the status of the common heritage principle by stating that
"[w]e regard it as essentially an abstract concept." Testimony before the Subcomm. on
Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (February 27, 1979). Ambassador Richardson has, however,
continued to favor a negotiated general settlement, as reflected by his recent defense of the
proposed Draft Convention:
As the Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference for
the most of the last four years, I can attest to the fact that the Draft Convention
represents neither a loss for the United States nor a victory for the Group of 77.
Rather, it embodies balanced and, I believe, acceptable compromises that emerged
from tough and protracted battles between the conflicting ideologies and interests of
both sides.
Richardson, Letter to the Editor, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 23, col. 1.
On the other side of the legal issue concerning unilateral seabed mining are Group of 77
spokesmen such as Ambassador Christopher Pinto of Sri Lanka, who articulated his position
as follows:
The common heritage of mankind is the common property of mankind . . . . The

minerals are owned by your country and mine, and by all the rest as well. In their
original location, these resources belong in undivided and indivisible share . . . to
all mankind, in fact, whether organized as States or not. If you touch the nodules at
the bottom. of the sea, you touch my property. If you take them away, you take
away my property.
Statement of Ambassador M.C.W. Pinto, reprinted in "Alternatives in Deepsea Mining"
(Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute Workshop, December 11-14, 1978) at 13
(S. Allen and J. Craven eds. 1979).
150. Act, supra note 1, §§ 201-04.
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Early in March of 1981, the Reagan Administration decided to
conduct a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Draft
Convention, and instructed acting representative George Aldrich
"to seek to insure that the negotiations do not end at the present
session of the conference."' 5 ' Although the formal outcome of the
review is not expected until early 1982,152 some indicators suggest
that the Administration intends to take a stronger position concerning the freedoms of the seas.
Along with the recent U.S.-Libyan incident, (which may or
may not be sui generis), foremost among these political indications
has been the recent statement of the Honorable James Malone,
Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Testifying in April before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committtee, Secretary Malone described some of the impacts of the Draft Convention which were of primary Administration concern:
The Draft Convention places under burdensome international
regulation the development of all of the resources of the seabed
and subsoil beyond ... national jurisdiction ... [It] would
establish a supranational mining company, called the Enterprise, which would benefit from significant discriminatory advantages relative to the companies of industrialized countries
....Moreover, [it] requires the U.S. and other nations to fund
the initial capitalization of the Enterprise, in proportion to their
contributions to the U.N .... [It] compels the sale of proprietary information and technology now largely in U.S. hands...
[It] limits the annual production of nodules . . .for the first
twenty years of production. [It] creates a one-nation one-vote
international governing Assembly, characterized as the "supreme' organ (of the proposed International Seabed Authority)
[In the] 36-member Executive Council, the Soviet Union
[..
and its allies have three guaranteed seats, but the U.S. must
compete with its allies for representation. 153
151. Somewhat conflicting accounts of the etymology of this decision were presented in
contemporaneous journalistic accounts. Compare Oberdorfer, Sea Law Treaty Being
Blocked, Wash. Post, Mar. 4, 1981, at A-i; Gwertzman, U.S. Bars Treaty ForNow on Use of

Sea Resources, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981 at 1,col. 6; Daily Oklahoman Mar. 5, 1981, at 13;
Dickson, Scuttling the Sea-Law Treaty, THE NATION, May 30, 1981, at 1.
152. But see Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Robert Knecht).

153. Hearingson the Tenth Session of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea before the Subcommittee on Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
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In response, the United States has been conducting "reciprocating states" negotiations with several of its allies, some of which
have already enacted legislation similar to that of the United
States.15 4 Should these negotiations result in substantial accord
concerning, inter alia, the currently unresolved issues concerning
minesite size, jurisdictional conflicts, and dispute resolution, an
orderly regime would begin to emerge, with mutual recognition of
property rights' 5 5 in licenses issued by reciprocating states. Such a
regime would not only constitute effective protest against the establishment of a "common property" regime,156 but might, assuming
substantial participation by the specially affected states, 5 7 constitute a foundation for its future evolution into the customary legal
regime as well.
The foregoing analysis of course, assumes the pessimistic conclusion that the finally-proposed sea treaty will not be harmonized
with perceived U.S. vital interests. Even the Group of 77, however,
generally recognizes that seabed mining will not occur absent sufficient economic incentive for private capital investment. The U.S.
mining industry also appears to realistically recognize both that an
internationally administered regime cannot give the United States a
better financial arrangement than it can give itself, and that the
value of the broader security of tenure offered by international
consent cannot be measured solely in a short-term economic context. Nevertheless, the residual problems detailed by Secretary Malone 5 8 still persist, and both local5'° and national 16 0 economic and

eries, House of Representatives, 97th Cong. 2d Sess. 4-6 (statement of James Malone); See
Third Hearing, supra note 7, at 31-32 (statement of Conrad Welling). For an examination of
some benefits of the proposed Draft Convention to the United States, see generally, Charney,
Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 598 (1977); UnilateralExploitation
of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 404-14. See also text accompanying notes 177-83 infra.
154. See note 35 supra. These negotiations are authorized by § 118 of the Act, supra
note 1.
155. The generally liberal license transfer provisions contained in the Act, supra note 1,
and Regulations, supra note 5, coupled with the Act's relatively stringent diligence requirements tend to promote rather than obstruct free alienation. Within the first ten years, such
alienation will almost certainly take place. See, Fourth Hearing, supra note 7, at 33 (statement of Alan Kauffman).
156. See notes 32, 148 supra.
157. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 3, 43.
158. See text accompanying note 153 supra.
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strategic interests continue to press for relatively unrestricted access.

B. The New InternationalEconomic Order
The primary countervailing consideration lies, of course, in
the necessity for responding meaningfully to the demands of the
developing countries for a new international economic order.'"
The necessity is derivative of moral, economic, and political concerns.
About a quarter of the world population lives in absolute
poverty. Life expectancies in the developing states are about 20 %
shorter than in the industrialized Northern countries, and their
infant mortality rate is five times as high. The thirty-five poorest
nations-accounting for 1.1 billion people-share only 3 % of the
world's wealth, and have annual per capita incomes of less than
$300. 162
At least two alternative sets of hypotheses concerning the

causes and effects of this poverty may be expressed. The former
propositions likely constitute at least the tacit assumptions of many
observers in the industrialized nations of the North:
First, that the international system created after World
War II, the so-called Bretton Woods system, really does not
discriminate against the South and is basically sound;
second, that the world's economic system still has to be
governed by countries in accordance with their economic
power;
third, that the problems of the developing countries are...
more due to their own internal policies than to anything to do
with the international environment; and

159. A processing plant located on Hawaii could increase the state's economic output by
almost one billion dollars per year. First Hearing, supra note 7, at 19 (statement of Hideto
Kono).
160. The economic and strategic impacts of such mineral imports are discussed in
Unilateral Exploitation oJ the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 341-44.
161. See, e.g., the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, which states as one of its primary goals worldwide economic cooperation "whereby
the prevailing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all." G.A.
Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 4, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974) at 5. See also the
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A.
Res. 3202 (S-VI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1) 5, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
162. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1981, at 36-37.
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fourth, . . . that the important issues of . . . security are
those of military power and are related mainly to East-West
63
issues.
The latter propositions, however, must also be considered in the

search for perspective and eventual worldwide political harmony:
[F]irst, . . . that international development efforts affect
the developing countries as much as . .. the developed world,
and that the developing countries both because of their size and
their numbers are going to have a much greater decision-making
role [therein] ... ;
second, that the international system either inadvertently
or purposely discriminates against the developing countries in a
variety of ways; and
[third], that what happens in the Third World as the result
of. . . economic factors. . . is going to have as much impact on
the growth and progress of the industrial world as it has on their
own. 164
The formulation of the development issue ultimately to prevail will
hopefully be based in significant measure upon judgments concerning the criteria for international distributive justice6 5 and the verifiability of the economic propositions asserted rather than exclusively upon short-sighted or self-interested criteria.
Pending further exploration of these issues, the North-South
cold war persists. The more moderate developing-state demands
include increased direct aid and investment, freer and preferably
interest-subsidized credit, and reduced trade barriers. More radical
are demands for: minimum prices on raw materials and agricultural exports, "common heritage" status for outer space, celestial
bodies, and, of course, the deep seabed,16 6 repudiation of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, 67 and the
163. North-South Dialogue: Progressand Prospects, Hearing before the Subcomm. on
InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade and on InternationalOrganizationsof the Comm.
on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 53, 56 (May 13, 1980)
(statement of John Sewell) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on North-South Dialogue].
164. See id. at 56-57.
165. An early and thoughtful international dialogue concerning these criteria might
provide the basis for subsequent and more specific negotiations. See generally, J. TINBERGEN,
RESHAPING THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 12 (1976).
166. See, e.g., The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, supra note 5 at
21-28; UnilateralExploitation of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5 at 368-84 and 393-94.
167. 21 U.S.T. 1583, 24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. 6923, 7727. See.Major Issues Arising
From the Transfer of Technology in Developing Countries, U.N. Sales No. E. 75 II.D. 2.
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imposition of an international income tax, couched in terms of
what Algerian President Chadli Benjedid, among others, has referred to as a "right" to world wealth redistribution.
At the recent Cancun summit, 8 the United States counterproposed negotiations, preferably bilateral or within the World Bank
or International Monetary Fund, 69 to discuss specific issues, including tariffs, investment, and development. It also offered some
gratuitous advice concerning the efficiency of capitalism and the
need for each developing country to "put its own house in order."' 170 The responses were predictable. President Nyerere of
Tanzania responded that "We are not here to talk about the internal affairs of any of us . . .

,"

and President Marcos of the Philip-

pines added, quite rightly, that "Corruption is not the exclusive
preserve of the Third World."' 17' Nevertheless, as the developed
states are asked to share increasing percentages of their ever more
limited wealth, the issues of internal efficiency and corruption, as

well as the related question concerning internal wealth disparities
in the developing states, should be addressed to insure that the
ultimate beneficiaries of that wealth are those whose need is the
greatest.
As has been indicated, economic as well as normative considerations support cooperation where possible. The United States currently runs a substantial trade surplus with the developing countries, which now receive about 40 % of all U.S. exports-more than
Europe, Japan, and Australia combined. In addition, the United
States imports about 30% of all its raw materials, including 100%
of its tin and natural rubber, 90 % of its bauxite, and 25 % of its
petroleum (resources which cannot be obtained from seabed mining) from such states. 172 Exports to the developing states include
168. This conference, held in late October in Cancun, Mexico, was designated to move
the "North-South Dialogue" to the summit level, and was attended by representatives of
eight "Northern" (developed) and fourteen "Southern" (developing) states. Participating
were Algeria, Austria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada; China (People's Republic), France,
Germany (Federal Republic), Great Britain, Guyana, India, Ivory Coast, Japan, Mexico,
Nigeria, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Tanzania, the United States, Venezuela,
and Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union did not attend, reportedly on the ground that poverty is
exclusively the result of capitalism.
169. Concerning the format of negotiations, President Reagan indicated that if negotiations meant that "some gigantic new international bureaucracy [would be] in charge, then
we would be opposed to that." NEwswEEK, Nov. 2, 1981, at 34.
170. See, e.g., Ungar, Cancun: "North" and "South" at the Summit, THE ATLANTIC,
Jan., 1982 at 7, 8.
171. Id. at 8.
172. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Gist (June 1981).
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50% of U.S. cotton, 65% of U.S. wheat, and 70% of U.S. rice, and
are estimated to create about 800,000 American jobs in manufac-

turing as well. U.S. investment in developing states is currently in
excess of $50 billion.1 73 This interdependence has made the pursuance of a unilateral oceans policy risky, with attendant dangers of

both decreased world economic growth and political instability.
There exists, of course, the possibility that the United States
will choose to pursue its ideological and economic interests separately by distinguishing the goals of the New International Economic Order from the practical and economic goals of oceans policy. The burden to so choose is likely to be placed upon the United
States in the near future. To sever the New International Economic
Order from oceans policy constitutes a formidable challenge, given
perceived deficiencies in the seriousness of the U.S. anti-poverty
commitment,174 and the direct capital or credit transfers such an

effort would require.' 75 It may be noted that the costs of a seabed

mining compromise are prospective (opportunity) costs only, pro76
vided the security of current investments is assured.
In short, both the United States and the developing countries
have considerable inducements to further serious negotiations at
UNCLOS. From the United States' strategic perspective, a negotiated compromise would assure: that the nodules recovered by its
citizens would be subject to clear and undisputed ownership, 77 that

173. See id.; Hearings on North-South Dialogue, supra note 163 at 108 (May 15, 1980)
(statement of Thomas Ehrlich).
174. U.S. development assistance now totals about 0.23% of its gross national product,
compared, for example, with a 0.4% figure for the United Kingdom and a U.N. target of
0.7%. West Germany and Japan have reportedly committed to 0.5% figures by 1985, and
some OPEC countries have claimed records in excess of 3 or 4%. See Hearings on NorthSouth Dialogue, supra note 163 at 57 (statement of John Sewell). In addition, the United
States is currently in arrears in its contributions to the World Bank, especially its International Development Association branch, which extends 50 year development loans at nominal interest. Ungar, supra note 170 at 8. Also criticized has been the United States' history of
tying aid to political cooperation, which seems unlikely to abate. See, e.g., the recent
statement of U.S. Deputy Ambassador to the United Nations Kenneth Adelman: "[t]here's
enough poverty and suffering, unfortunately, in those countries that share our approach to
the world to really soak up . . . all the resources we have in this area." Daily Oklahoman,
Nov. 20, 1981, at 20A.
175. Concerning potential intermediate positions, see text accompanying note 169 supra.
176. Although an opportunity cost only, its burden does fall exclusively on the eight to
ten states with seabed mining investments rather than being distributed equitably among all
the developed states of the world.
177. See Unilateral Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 405-06.
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exclusive claims to nodule tracts would be internationally recognized, 78 and that the United States, as part of the UNCLOS "package," 179 would enjoy certain strategic benefits unavailable pursuant
to customary international law.8 0 From a political perspective,
the United States would benefit from the resultant developing state
perception that its intent to promote the New International Economic Order was bona fide, and might ironically gain prestige
among the European allies as well. 8' From a moral standpoint,
the United States would (assuming the final acceptability of some
revenue-sharing or technology-transfer obligations) be taking 8a2
short but meaningful step toward the abolition of world hunger,1
and would help to assure that its nineteenth century Indian policy
does not become a paradigm for its policy toward the developing
3
states in the twentieth.

18

The developing state negotiating inducements are both economic and symbolic. The former involves the recognition that any
benefits from seabed mining are contingent upon participation in
the system by the developed states. Symbolically, the primary inducements stem from the desire to insure the success of the United
Nations negotiating process at UNCLOS (with its one-nation-one178. See id.at 406-07.
179. See id. at 387-88; Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Rules
of Procedure, 31 U.N. GAOB, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/30/Rev. 2 at 18 (1976).
180. See Unilateral Exploitation of the Deep Seabed, supra note 5, at 407-13. See
generally Arrow, Prospective Impacts of the Draft Sea Convention, 1 Int'l Prop. Inv. J. (1981).
181. In 1980, the Brandt Commission, in a World Bank study, reported that credit and
monetary reform, inter alia, were essential to a program of world economic survival. In
addition, France has recently been reported to have urged the United States to back a reform
package for the World Bank and I.M.F., as well as increasing its direct aid and commitment
to commodity price supports. Foreign Minister Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany
has also endorsed a new economic order generally. See also note 174, supra. But see text
accompanying note-154, supra.
182. In 1979, a Presidential Commission recommended that the United States "make
the elimination of hunger the primary focus of its relationships with developing countries .. ."United States, Presidential Commission on World Hunger, Preliminary Report at
III. 6 (1979). The report also noted that since the primary cause of hunger is poverty, efforts
to eliminate hunger need focus more generally on the abolition of poverty as well.
183. The President's Cancun advice to the developing states concerning the virtues of
capitalism may be vaguely reminiscent of the early American attitude, for example, toward
communally-owned Indian land. In 1816, Secretary of War Crawford told the Senate, "No
one will exert himself to procure the comforts of life unless his right to enjoy them is
exclusive." Address by Secretary Crawford to the U.S. Senate, March 13, 1816, at II American State Papers, Indian Affairs 26-27 (1834), cited in M. RocIN, FATHERS AND CHILDREN:
ANDREW JACKSON AND THE SUBJUGATION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 180 (1976).
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vote premise), as well as the more substantive and immediate goal
of furthering the New International Economic-Order.
Some intransigence on both sides may be anticipated. The
United States' legal position concerning the validity of unilateral,
nonexclusive seabed mining is a strong one, likely occupying the
favorable position of the "incumbent" principle, and economically,
an international regime would, of course, inevitably be more expensive and difficult to control than a unilateral or "reciprocating
states" regime. On the other side, while the developing states' legal
principle is still the challenger, political and ideological gains may
be perceived by some developing states in forcing the United States
into either accepting an unacceptable regime, or committing itself
to defend its seabed miners by force. No such commitment currently exists in the United States Act,' 84 which actually requires the
Administrator to suspend any exploration license likely to create a
situation which may reasonably be expected to result in armed
conflict. 18 5
In the meanwhile, the "reciprocating states" negotiations'1 6
provide the best bellwether of prospective U.S. policy. Several
specific issues-including individual minesite size, the cumulative
seabed area to be licensed, the diligence with which the exploration
actually occurs, and the prospects for unlimited production in the
commercial recovery phase-are likely to be concluded by these
negotiations. The resolution of these issues by the reciprocating
states 87 and the results of the U.S. policy review may well signal
the extent to which only partially satisfactory political compromise
is ultimately to be preferred to the perpetuation of the freedom of
the seas by force.

184. Act, supra note 1, art. 3(a)(1)(2).

185. Id., art. 105(a)(3).
186. See note 148 supra.
187. See generally, First Hearing, supra note 7, at 28-31 (statement of John Craven);
Third Hearing, supra note 7 at 19 (statement of Phil Grote).

